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INTRODUCTION
Many farmers are currently  facing severe  financial stress  resulting in
asset  liquidations, problems  in  obtaining credit,  and  even bankruptcy.  An
important  question in farm analysis is  the applicability  of  traditional
policy approaches  to the  problem of  financial stress  in agriculture,  and  the
appropriate farm policy in this financially stressful  time.  This  is  a par-
ticularly relevant question given that  the  1983 PIK program was  one  of  the
most  expensive and largest government  transfer programs for  agriculture in
recent history, and yet many farmers  are still  facing severe  financial
problems.
The roots  of  the  financial problems  of  farmers  today can be  traced to
the environment  of  the  1970s  and  the dramatic changes  in that environment
during the early  1980s.  The decade of  the  1970s  can be  characterized by
high inflation rates, growing foreign and domestic demand for  farm products,
very low or negative real  rates of  interest, and a willingness  to substitute
asset appreciation for  current earnings.  Farmers  borrowed heavily to
purchase capital inputs and farmland and to  aggressively expand their opera-
tions.  Then in the 1980s  interest  rates  rose  to unprecedented high levels,
foreign and domestic demand for farm commodities declined  significantly
because of worldwide recession, incomes dropped dramatically, and  land
values began a steady  and relatively steep decline.  Those farmers  with high
debt  loads  found it difficult  to collateralize and  service that  debt with
high interest rates,  low  incomes,  and  decreasing land values.-2-
FINANCIAL  STRESS IN AGRICULTURE
Melichar (November 1984) was  the first  to document  the financial con-
dition of  the agricultural sector;  those data will not  be  repeated  in detail
here.  A key dimension of  this documentation is  the distribution of  debt
(Table  1).  This distribution indicated  that in  1984  approximately 58  per-
cent of  the  farms  in the United States had leverage  ratios  of  10  percent or
less,  24  percent had ratios  of  from  11-40 percent,  11  percent had  ratios  of
41-70 percent and 8 percent had  leverage ratios  in excess  of  70  percent.
This highly leveraged category  (greater than 70  percent) controlled 31  per-
cent  of  the debt  and 8 percent of  the  assets  in U.S.  agriculture.  With
current  price, cost,  and productivity relationships in agriculture, these
highly leveraged  farms  are unable  to make interest  payments on  their indebt-
edness,  let alone  repay any principal.  In  fact, Melichar's  calculations
suggest  that  farms  with debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 30  percent will
likely encounter some financial stress at  current  interest rates  and rates
of  return on assets.
Survey data from individual Iowa farms collaborate Melichar's results
and implications  (Jolly,  1984).  Of  the  1,231  farmers surveyed, 31  percent
had no real estate or  nonreal estate debt  and exhibited debt-to-asset  ratios
averaging  1.8  percent;  these farmers  are not  financially stressed by  the
current  economic conditions in agriculture.  In contrast, 40  percent  of  the
farmers have  both real estate and nonreal  estate debt  and a debt-to-asset
ratio averaging 41.7  percent.  Table  2 indicates  the  distribution of  opera--3-
tors,  assets,  and  liabilities  for  the Iowa  sample by  debt-to-asset  category;
the distributional results are very similar to  those in Table  1 from
Melichar's  work.  Size classification of  the data (Table 3) suggests  that
financial stress problems  are not  unique  to a particular size  farm - farms
of all  sizes  are encountering such stress.
More  recent studies corroborate  that the  financial stress  in  agri-
culture is not unique to Iowa.  A national survey in January  1985 by Farm
Journal and the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute  indicates
that  nationwide,  15.4  percent of  farmers have debt-to-asset ratios  exceeding
70 percent, and 17.9  percent have debt-to-asset ratios  of  40-70 percent;
these  farmers account  for 30.8  percent and  34.9 percent  of  the debt  respec-
tively  (Farm Journal, March 1985).  For the  central states,  the  data
indicate a more severe problem;  21.0  percent of  the farmers  have debt-to-
asset  ratios exceeding 70  percent and  21.5  percent have ratios  of  40-70 per-
cent.  Comparing these  numbers to  those obtained  for Iowa in  1984  suggests
that  the financial conditions have deteriorated  significantly in just  one
year.
A recently  released USDA study also documents  the  nationwide charac-
teristics of  the problem (USDA, 1985).  That study estimated that  as  of
January 1985,  6.3  percent  of  family-sized farms  in the United States  holding
9.3  percent  of the debt are  insolvent;  7.4  percent of  the  farms holding  11.1
percent of  the debt have debt-to-asset  ratios  of  from 70-100  percent, and  20
percent  of  the  farms holding 25.9 percent  of  the debt have debt-to-asset-4-
ratios of 40-70.
Financial management  strategies and enhanced  farm and off-farm income
can be  used to relieve the  stress for many farms,  but  those with higher
leverage ratios  (for example, 70  percent or  greater) will  likely  not be  able
to obtain sufficient relief  from various financial and  farm management
strategies  to stave off  asset  liquidation or  default.  In  essence,  at  least
8-10  percent of U.S.  farm assets  must find a new owner in  the next year  or
so, or the debt secured by those assets will not  be  serviced.  Even those
with debt-to-asset ratios of  40-70 percent will experience declining equity
(even if land values stabilize) unless commodity prices  rise,  interest  rates
and other input prices  fall,  or productivity increases.  In  essence, the
financial stress is  substantial  for a significant subset of  the  farm popula-
tion.
The financial stress problems  faced by farmers have  important implica-
tions  beyond the farm gate.  One  of  the first  is  the  "shortfall"  in interest
and principal payments  that  the lenders will not  receive  this year.  Doye
and Jolly have estimated  that  nationwide $2.2  billion of  scheduled interest
payments  and $6.2  billion  of principal payments will not  be made  by  farmers
because they do not have the  cash to  service  loan obligations  (Doye and
Jolly,  1985).  These  "shortfalls" will have a significant  impact  on  the  ear-
nings and the liquidity of  those who make  loans  to  farmers.  Furthermore,
lenders will encounter significantly higher  loan  loss  ratios  in the  future.
Melichar has  indicated that  these ratios  have  risen dramatically  for  commer--5-
cial banks, and similar data indicate equal or more  rapid deterioration  in
the portfolios of the  Farm Credit  System Agencies  (PCAs, FLBs).  A recent
GAO study of  the Farm Credit  System has projected  its  losses  at  $2.6  billion
for the year ending June 30,  1986,  and some analysts  are  suggesting that  the
"surprises" in the portfolio in  the form of under-collateralized loans  may
add to  the  losses (Wall Street Journal, October 7, 1985).  The  losses  that
have resulted  in  11  bank  failures in  Iowa since June 30,  1984,  continue  to
plague that industry.  A recent  survey indicates  that  for  the agricultural
banks  in Iowa,  troubled debt  increased by  60  percent since June  30,  1984,
and now accounts  for more than 32  percent  of  capital.  Troubled  debt  is
greater than equity capital at  24  banks,  and  more than 90  banks  lost  money
in  the first half of  1985.  Nationwide, 363  of  the  975  banks  on  the  FDIC's
troubled bank list are agricultural banks  (Des Moines  Sunday Register,
October  13,  1985).  Analysis  by Reinders  indicates  that with 3 to 5 percent
loss  ratios (which some lenders are now encountering) even a very  finan-
cially sound  lender with 20 percent  equity can remain  in  business  for only
three to four years (Reinders,  1985).
The agricultural  input supply  firms  have  financial  problems  as  well.
Ginder indicates that  there has  been a 400  percent  increase in accounts
receivable write-offs  (losses) from 1981  to  1984  in a representative sample
of cooperative input supply  firms in the  central states  (Ginder,  1985).
Approximately one-third of  the sample  firms have debt-to-asset  ratios
exceeding  70 percent.  If  bad debts  total  1 to 2 percent of  sales,  25  per--6-
cent  of  these firms will have debt servicing problems, and  bad debt  of 3 to
4 percent of  sales would almost  double the number of  firms with debt ser-
vicing problems.  Currently, these  firms have 1 percent  of  sales  in accounts
receivable outstanding for  180  days  or more (much of which will not  be
collected) and another 1 percent in accounts receivable  of  60  to  180  days.
Thus, many agribusiness  firms are  also financially vulnerable and  a relati-
vely  small increase in non-payment  on accounts  receivable or a loss  due  to  a
farmer bankruptcy would threaten  their survival.
The financial problems  of  farmers  and agriculture may be  sufficiently
large to  impact  the public at  large and the performance of  the national
economy.  This  impact will  likely not  occur through shortages  of  food and
higher food prices, but  through the  financial markets.  Wharton Econometrics
has assessed the  impact of financial stress in agriculture that results  in
non-payment of agricultural debt  on the  financial stability of  the  lending
institutions and financial markets.  Their analysis  suggests  that with a
continuation of current farm income  conditions  and  no government  assistance
to solve  the farm financial  crisis,  loan  losses  could  total as  much  as  $20
to 25  billion, which is approximately  10  percent  of  the  total $212  billion
agricultural debt.  A write-off  of  this magnitude would result  in higher
short-term private interest rates  "due to  the  public perception of  substan-
tially higher risk being associated with financial asset holdings."  The
Wharton study argues  that  "although agricultural debt  is  dispersed among
many  creditors,  the  impact of  large and widespread  defaults on commercial-7-
banks and the  farm credit systems  is expected  to  be sufficient to affect
national financial markets."  Their study  indicates  that  the  result  of  a
write-off of  $20  to $25  billion of  agricultural debt  would be a 75  to  125
basis point  increase in short-term interest rates,  175,000  to  275,000  jobs
lost,  a reduction in total gross national product  by  $30  to  $50  billion, and
a $14  to  $21  billion increase  in the  federal debt.  The Wharton study
suggests  that  financial  stress faced  by  agriculture will  eventually impact
the national economy and  the public at  large unless  preemptive measures  are
taken to  resolve  the  farm financial crisis.
In summary, the impact of  financial stress  in agriculture  on  the  U.S.
economy might be visualized as  a series of  waves.  The first wave will
involve those highly  leveraged farmers who  cannot service  their entire debt
load.  As  these highly leveraged farms  attempt to  resolve  their  financial
stress  through  the sale  or other disposition of  assets,  the  remaining  farm
population will incur costs in  the form of  reduced land  values  and  the
resulting impaired credit worthiness caused by  declining collateral.  This
is  the second wave.  The  third wave occurs  when farmers  reduce  their purcha-
ses of  capital items from local suppliers and are not  able  to pay  on open
accounts  and trade credit extended by  input supply firms.  Thus,  the  local
community absorbs part  of  the  loss  or  cost  because of  reduced  retail  sales
and economic activity, as well as  losses  from non-payment on accounts
receivable and bankruptcies.-8-
One of  the institutions  that will not receive  payments from financially
stressed farmers  is  the  lending institution.  As lending  institutions become
financially vulnerable, particularly  those that access national money
markets such as  the Farm Credit System, the financial markets begin adding a
larger risk premium to interest  rates  to  compensate for the  default  risk and
non-performance of borrowers.  Interest rates will  rise first  for agri-
cultural loans,  but  if  the loss  is  large enough, the  financial markets will
require a larger risk premium from all borrowers - non-farm businesses,
governments, and consumers.  This  is  the fourth wave and the mechanism by
which losses in agriculture will be  transferred  to non-farm businesses,  con-
sumers, and the economy  at  large.  Note that  this  transfer occurs  not
through higher food costs, but  through higher interest  rates.  Thus,  the
public will pay for part of  the financial stress  in agriculture,  either
through higher interest  rates and  larger government deficits due  to  the  eco-
nomic slowdown that  is a result  of  higher interest  rates,  or  through
increased direct government expenditures  to fund  preemptive public sector
intervention to reduce the consequences  of  financial stress  in agriculture
on the  overall economy.-9-
SECTOR ADJUSTMENTS TO OBTAIN STABILITY
Five major long-run adjustments  appear necessary  to  obtain a more
financially stable  agricultural sector.  These include:
1.  Lower interest  rates.  Lower interest  rates would benefit  agri-
culture  in four ways:  lower  direct costs of  borrowing money, a lower  valued
dollar and  increased  demand and  prices in  the  export markets,  lower  inven-
tory carrying charges  for holders and purchasers of  agricultural  commodities
and  thus marginally higher prices,  and  lower interest  costs  for supply  firms
and thus marginally reduced prices  of  purchased inputs.  Interest  rates,
real and nominal, are very high by historical standards.  Most analysts
agree that  reduction in the government deficit would result in  lower  real
and nominal interest  rates  and a somewhat  lower valued dollar.  The impor-
tance  of  lower interest rates  for  agriculture is  difficult to  overstate;  a
1 percent decline in interest  rates on  the over $200 billion of  U.S.  agri-
cultural debt would result  in  an approximate $2 billion  increase in net  farm
income.  Tweeten estimates  that  lower  interest  rates  resulting  from a
balanced budget would  reduce  the value of  the  dollar in foreign  markets by
20 percent,  leading to a 10 percent increase  in exports within two years  and
as  much as  a 20 percent improvement  in  the  longer  run  (Tweeten, 1985).
2.  Mothball excess  capacity.  The U.S.  agricultural sector  currently
has approximately 5 to  10  percent  excess production  capacity (Tweeten).
This  contributes significantly to  the current  low  rate of  return  on  farm
assets.  Yet, the productive  capability of  some of  the  agricultural asset-10-
base  is deteriorating because  of excessive  soil  erosion.  Conversion of  20
to 30 million acres of  steep, erosive  and  low yielding grain  land to grass
or nonuse is  one way to eliminate excess production and  reduce soil  erosion.
3.  Lower resource values.  In  a period of  excess  capacity, a normal
economic response is  lower resource  earnings  and  lower asset values.  Land
values in parts of  the United States are  35-40 percent  below the  peak  of  the
early  1980s.  Given current prospects for  prices,  interest  rates,  and
expected input costs, farm asset values  may fall further.  The financial
stress  of  farmers further  compounds  the problem because a major strategy  for
alleviating financial stress is  asset  liquidation.  Such liquidations
increase the supply of  land on the market  and  further  contribute to  land
price declines.
4.  Debt  reduction.  The  total debt  load of  agriculture  is  not  evenly
distributed.  About one-third of  the  farmers  owe  approximately two-thirds of
the debt.  For many of  these farmers,  earning capacity  of  assets  is  not  suf-
ficient  to cover debt service  costs with current interest rates  and  profit
margins.  This "excessive" debt must  either be  redistributed  or  eliminated.
Redistribution may  occur through debt-financed purchases  of  assets  from
those having cash flow problems  by  financially sound farmers  or  other
investors.  A reduction of  the industry debt  load will  occur by  repayment of
debt with earnings from either on-  or off-farm sources,  by  substitution of
equity from outside the agricultural sector for farm debt,  or by  discharge
of  debt by  agricultural lenders.  Probably a significant  amount  of  agri--11-
cultural debt will be discharged or written off  over  the next  three  to  five
years by  the public and private  lending institutions  that  service  agri-
culture.  This discharge of  indebtedness will represent significant  costs  to
lenders  in the short  run, but  it will reduce the  sector debt  load and
improve  agriculture's  financial condition  in the  long  run.
5.  Restructuring asset  ownership.  Some  farmers with very high debt
loads  cannot  "afford"  to  own all of  their assets,  and these assets  must  find
new owners.  This asset restructuring in many cases will accompany the
redistribution and restructuring of debt.  Lenders will inventory some
assets in lieu of the note or mortgage,  but  these assets will eventually be
placed on the market.  Accompanying this  restructuring of  the  ownership pat-
tern of  assets will be a set  of  important  issues  concerning the  tenure
arrangements in  agriculture including the  institutional structure and
property rights  of tenants versus landlords,  the  advantages and disadvan-
tages  of  the separation of  ownership and operation  of  real estate, and  the
volatile issue of  outside equity in agriculture.
BENEFICIARIES OF AN ASSISTANCE  PROGRAM 1
From a policy  perspective, any proposal should  establish general  guide-
lines as  to  farmers,  lenders  and others who would reasonably be  benefited
1Taken from "Alternatives  for Public Intervention to Assist  in Stabilizing
Farm and Ranch Financial Conditions,"  prepared by Neil  E. Harl, Robert W.
Jolly and Michael D. Boehlje, Department  of Economics, Iowa State University,
Ames, Iowa,  and Steven E. Zumbach, Partner with Belin,  Harris, Helmick,
Heartney and Tesdell, Des Moines, Iowa.  Unpublished paper, Iowa State
University, Ames, Iowa, 1985.-12-
by  the program intervention and those who  realistically could not  benefit
from  the program.  The most  recent  financial survey of  farm operators  con-
ducted by  the USDA delineates three broad groups  toward which specific poli-
cies might  be targeted.  This information is  summarized in Table  4.
There are  farms whose financial condition is  so weak  that  debt  and
asset restructuring is  not  effective or feasible.  We designate this  group
as  not  restructurable.  Their most  likely option would be  to  exit agri-
culture.  We  identify farmers  in this  group as  those who are  technically
insolvent as  of January 1, 1985,  or had a return  to equity of less  than -20
percent  in 1984.  Farmers  in  this group are  consuming their capital  stock so
rapidly  it is unlikely  they can  reorganize soon enough to avoid  insolvency -
particularly with the pressure of  continuing declines in asset values.
Restructurable farms  are  those that  can reorganize debts  and assets  and
become  profitable under economic conditions  likely to  prevail  over  the  next
five to ten years.  This  group consists  of  farmers with a return to  equity
from -20  percent  to +5 percent  in 1984.
Profitable farms  are  defined as  those who  earned more than 5 percent  on
equity in 1984.  This  group includes  "going concerns" whose financial  struc-
ture  is appropriate  for  current  and expected economic conditions.  It  also
includes possible or recent  entrants who have  taken advantage of  lower  asset
values and started  farming.
The needs  of  these groups  for  financial assistance vary.  In addition,
their needs  depend fundamentally on whether or not  current  economic  con--13-
ditions  persist or will change abruptly  in a year  or  two.  Farm businesses
must adjust to economic conditions characterized by high  real interest
rates,  commodity prices near  current  levels  and continuing variability in
input and output  prices.  Changes  in these assumptions would alter  the
degree but not  likely  the kind of  adjustment  required for  financial viability.
Nonstructurable  farms need  to exit quickly without the  risk of  further
declines in the value of  assets.  Current market  conditions will not  permit
this group to sell out.  Delays erode what  little equity they have
remaining.  Furthermore, asset  liquidations  by this group should be  isolated
from the market to avoid depressing asset  values for  all  producers.
Restructurable farms  need  to move toward  a viable  financial structure
quickly.  Frequently this  involves  liquidating land and,  in  some cases,
leasing additional assets.  Again, these changes  can be  accomplished if  the
liquidity of  asset and rental markets  can  be  increased.  Increased  market
liquidity results  in a greater and  more  rapid volume of  transactions  and
less reduction in asset  values  replacing reduced price  response.
Profitable farms, particularly new entrants, need stable  asset  markets
and access  to  long-term financing.  Declining asset  values erode  the nor-
mally  low equity of  younger or  entering farmers.  This places  them at  risk
from insolvency.  Further, credit  rationing by  lenders  because of  insolvency
risk may  limit efficiency and  growth of  these nascent  businesses.
Deregulation and widespread agricultural loan losses may lead  to  rela-
tively high and variable  interest rates.  Beginning farmers particularly-14-
need access  to long-term financing with predictable  and  flexible  debt  ser-
vice requirements.  During the ensuing period of financial adjustment,
existing lenders may be hard-pressed to  provide financing of  this  sort.
SHORT-TERM PUBLIC POLICIES TO AID TRANSITION
A number of  transition policies  involving credit  or lender adjustments
are being discussed to deal with  current financial stress of  farmers  (Brake,
Boehlje and Lee;  Doye and Jolly).  Five  of  the more  frequently discussed
policies  are debt  restructuring, principal forgiveness  (write-off),  interest
buy-down, foreclosure moratoria,  and inventorying assets  or facilitating
changes  in asset ownership patterns.
1.  Debt  restructuring.  This refers  to rescheduling  of  loan commit-
ments by  refinancing or rewriting short-term or intermediate-term debt  to a
long-term basis if justified  by  real estate  collateral.  Alternatively, each
class  of loans - short, intermediate  and long-term - may be rescheduled over
a longer repayment period.  The premise of  restructuring is  that  additional
time  to repay the principal reduces annual  obligations.
Debt  restructuring can be  done voluntarily, and  it  can be useful  for
some percentage of farmers  in trouble,  i.e.,  those who need marginal help
rather than massive  help.  For borrowers whose short-  or  intermediate-term
debt  is a high proportion of  total debt,  substantial improvement in  cash
flow may result  from restructuring.  However, the  long-term benefits of
restructuring should not  be  overestimated (Boehlje, Thamodaran and Barkema).-15-
While restructuring is  typically done on a voluntary basis  by  the
lender, it may be encouraged by  a government guarantee of  the  loan.  FmHA
has used this approach of providing a guarantee for  90  percent  of  the  prin-
cipal if  the  lender will write down the  debt by  at  least  10  percent
(principal or interest  rate equivalent) and  then restructure  the  loan  so
that  a cash flow budget  shows obligations  can  be  met.
Restructuring farmer debt  involves  few costs  to borrower or  lender if
the situation is  analyzed carefully beforehand.  There are  no public costs
unless loan guarantees are involved.  Probably much of  the potential volun-
tary debt  restructuring has  already occurred,  however.
2.  Principal forgiveness  or write-down.  A write-down might recognize
that the value of the asset  has  fallen below  the loan amount.  Or,  a write-
down may be negotiated to ease impossible debt  service  requirements.
Whether the write-down will resolve  the problem depends on  the  debt  service
obligation in relation to  income.
A write-down initiated by  examiners  can  create a problem for  lenders
because it  represents a direct loss  of  equity on  the books.  The  lender
might not agree with the examiner's  analysis,  yet  the examiner  forces  the
lender  to  reduce asset values,  in turn eroding lender equity.
A principal buy-down is  typically  initiated through a public credit
policy.  An FmHA guarantee,  for example, might apply  if  the lender writes
down part of  the outstanding principal and  restructures payments  to  ease  the
debt service burden of  the borrower.-16-
While principal forgiveness or buy-down helps  farmers  in financial
stress, it may  lead  to ill-will on the  part of  other  farmers.  They see
financially troubled farmers gaining  "unfair"  advantages.  Principal
forgiveness represents a cost  to  the lender, and a principal buy-down is  a
cost  to  taxpayers.  Both, however, do ease  the  debt  burden of  the finan-
cially  stressed borrower.
3.  Interest buy-down.  This  policy involves interest  rate  reductions
on an existing loan.  The buy-down  refers  to  the government paying a part  of
the cost  of an interest rate  reduction if  the private  lender will reduce  the
interest rate.  On a 14  percent loan,  for example, a 4 percent buy-down
would lower the interest rate  to 10  percent.  Some part  of  the  cost  would be
borne by  the government and  the remainder by  the private lender.  An
interest buy-down speaks directly to  the basic  problem facing financially
stressed farmers - too much debt  service.
Interest rate buy-downs can be  implemented  in many ways,  including a
direct government payment, an increased tax write-off for farm interest
payments, a public guarantee  to  reduce the risk faced  by  lenders (allowing
lenders  to charge a lower rate),  and  the use  of  tax-exempt revenue  bonds  to
obtain lower cost funds  for agriculture.
The effectiveness  of  an interest  buy-down is  directly  related  to  the
amount  of  the reduction.  While  it  is  relatively effective  in reducing the
debt service burden, it  is  also expensive.  A 4 percentage  point reduction
in interest rates on all debt owed  by  farmers with debt-asset ratios  pf  over-17-
40 percent would require about  $4 billion (Doye and Jolly).
The effect on lenders  of  an interest  buy-down depends  on the fraction
of  cost paid by  the government  and expected  loss  through default  if  the
borrower is  not given some  relief.  Probably lenders would utilize an
interest  buy-down for borrowers  who could not  make  it  otherwise, but  they
would resist  for those who might  survive  by  other means.
4.  Foreclosure moratoria.  Moratoria have  received substantial
discussion.  The purpose of  a foreclosure moratorium is  to stop proceedings
to enable  the financially stressed producer to  gain temporary relief  from
excessive financial obligations.  A key to  the success  of  this  approach  is  a
relatively quick turnaround in  the condition of  the industry.
Moratoria as applied under the Frazier-Lemke Act  in the  1930s  affected
only real estate loans  (Munger and Feder).  The  farm was appraised, and  the
court  granted a moratorium for three years.  The farmer  kept  the  property in
his possession, continued to  farm, and  paid rent  for  its  use.  Within  three
years the  farmer could pay  the appraised value and redeem his  property;  if
not  redeemed, it was sold.  The farmer was  not  liable  for loan amounts
greater than the lesser of  the appraised value  of  the property or  its  sale
price.
The moratorium approach limited farmer  losses  although it  required some
payment  for use of  the property.  The main advantage, however, was  that  the
courts  could force creditors  and borrowers to work out  their differences.
The experience of  the  1930s was  that  relatively few farmers  took advantage-18-
of this approach.  Creditors quickly made adjustments  in lending practices,
reducing new loans in states  that had moratoria.  If  applied  today,  one
might expect that moratoria would raise interest  rates to  compensate  for
increased risk and costs  in agricultural  lending, decrease  credit
availability, but stabilize asset values since  fewer  assets would be  forced
onto the market.
More  recently, attempts have been made  to develop  targeted  or  limited
moratoria that  limit the  lender's  right to  foreclose.  For example,  a
limited moratorium allows  the lender  to foreclose but  only after he  has made
a "good faith" attempt  to use all public sector credit  assistance programs
available.  Or,  the  lender might be  restricted from foreclosing  for non-
payment of principal,  i.e.,  the lender  could foreclose only  if  the borrower
falls behind on interest payments.  In essence,  conditional moratoria are  a
means  to encourage  the  reluctant  lender to cooperate with and  assist  those
borrowers facing financial stress.
5.  Inventorying or  facilitating changes  in ownership patterns of
assets.  A number of means  could aid in  this  approach.  For example,  lending
institutions  might be encouraged to  take title  to property in lieu of  debt
obligations  and  lease the property back  to  the original  debtor.  Then other
resources such as machinery and equipment would not  require  liquidation.
The lender would be converting a nonperforming asset  into one
generating at  least  some  return.  To avoid the  problem of  lender illiquidity
from holding such assets,  the  government would likely need  to provide  funds-19-
(perhaps through the Federal Reserve discount window or  sale  of  government-
guaranteed bonds)  in the  amount of  the  transferred assets.  Such government
funds  could be provided  at  lower cost  than funds  from the private sector,
partly offsetting the  lower  return earned  on  rental.  The lender might be
required to  remove the assets  from its  portfolio over a two-  to four-year
period.  The original debtor would have first option to buy.
Government programs  could also  be  initiated to hold repossessed  land
off  the market.  For example, FmHA is,  in some  places, already holding
foreclosed land off the market for one  to  three years.
Private lenders  could be  assisted in other ways  in holding land  off  the
market.  Bank regulations typically require that  real estate assets  taken
over by  the bank be valued at  market  first, and  then be written down
annually to discourage holding of  such assets.  The bank  loses equity and  is
encouraged  to dump assets.  Some states even prohibit  ownership of  farmland
by lenders  or corporations,  thus forcing repossessed  farmland onto  the
market.
Methods should be  considered  to enable lenders  to have  more flexibility
in recognizing the  losses in their agricultural  portfolio.  A longer period
over which assets are written down  to market  value  (possibly 3-5  years)
would allow the lender  to offset  the loss with  future earnings  rather  than
impair the  capital base of  the institution.  Capital certificates provided
by  the U.S. government in the amount  of  losses  on agricultural loans  that
must be amortized over  time  (5-10 years) may also  be a useful mechanism for-20-
using time and future earnings to  blunt  the size of  the losses  on  the finan-
cial viability of  lending institutions.  This procedure would involve
government guarantees of  the  capital structure of  the lender  rather than
part of  the loan portfolio.
An alternative approach would be  for a state  or  the federal government
to charter an entity to acquire nonperforming real  estate debt  and the
assets  securing that debt  from lenders  (Harl).  Acquisitions would  be held
off the market, perhaps  leased back  to the  original farmer, or  put into a
conservation  reserve program.  Funding could  come from sale of  state or
federally  issued tax-exempt bonds.
Programs  to stabilize asset  values have advantages and disadvantages.
They are  beneficial for farmers  in  financial trouble, primarily by main-
taining collateral values  on their individual balance sheets.  Such  policies
also permit  lenders  to exercise  forbearance because of  being  in less  severe
financial circumstances themselves.  There would  be mixed benefits  for
farmers not  in trouble.  Asset values would remain at  higher  levels,  so
individual balance sheets would be  less negatively  affected.  Untroubled
farmers, or other investors wanting to  expand their  asset base, however,
would have to pay more  to acquire assets.  Lenders, of  course, would  be most
affected by  such policies since  the basic  purpose of  the policies would be
to protect them.  Consumers  and  taxpayers would benefit  from the increased
stability associated with meaningful programs  to  keep asset markets from
overreacting downward.-21-
6.  Other.  Three additional approaches deserve  brief mention.  Farm
price and income policies have been a traditional approach to  raise  farm
income and ease financial problems.  Improved income  from such policies
would increase  the debt service  capacity of  farmers  and would stabilize
asset values at  higher levels.  But  in the  current situation, the  tradi-
tional approach falls  short because:  (1) cash shortfalls  for the  bulk of
distressed farmers  are  so great  (Bullock, Economic Research Service),  (2)
the policies are very  expensive, and (3) needed adjustments  of  capital  and
resources out  of  the sector are restricted.
Monetary and fiscal policies  clearly affect  farmer well being  given
their direct  impact on debt service  costs,  carrying charges,  and  dollar
exchange  rates.  Lower real and nominal interest  rates would be  helpful to
the entire agricultural sector.
Given market  indications  that  resources,  including human resources,
need to exit agriculture,  increased attention should be  given to programs
and policies to help people make the  transition out  of  farming.  For  too
long our efforts have worked  to avoid exit rather  than to  assist in  the
adjustment out.  Research studying displaced farmers  gives  disturbing
results (Heffernan and Heffernan).  Three-quarters  of displaced  farmers  stay
in the community, but  close  to one  half  appear headed toward  poverty.  The
personal trauma, social upheaval, and  loss  of  productivity  to  the economy
from ignoring  this problem are a high price  for society  to pay.-22-
CHANGING RURAL ATTITUDES
There is a fundamental concern that I would like  to  share concerning
changing attitudes  in rural  communities  that  suggest increased  polarization,
divisiveness, and the potential for  confrontation.  I do not  have numerical
documentation for this  changing attitude, but discussions with farmers  and
lenders suggest  that  it  is  real and increasingly  pervasive.  This changing
attitude has at least  three dimensions.  First,  business relationships  in
rural communities are deteriorating.  Farmers who were willing to cooperate
with their lender in making adjustments  in prior years  are  taking a more
protective-of-self stance.  Merchants and  dealers are  less  willing to
operate without excessive  legal documentation of  transactions.  Business
people are becoming more suspicious and less  trusting in their dealings.
This  "non-cooperative" attitude shows  up clearly in  the  lending  rela-
tionships in which farmers use  the threat  of  bankruptcy  to  gain accom-
modations from the  lender.  Some farmers  are  "building new houses,"
separating  real estate and other assets from  the  farm business  and  their  own
personal ownership by  transfers  to  children and other family members to  pro-
tect property from creditors and to have a base  to restart  if  the  "old
house" - the  current farm - is  lost.  Second,  some farmers who have  the
financial ability to pay on their obligations  are consciously debating
whether they should do so.  This  is  particularly the  case with Farm Credit
Systems  borrowers where the discussions  of financial assistance or a "bail
out" are most frequent.  The arguments  for non-payment are  threefold:  first,-23-
the proceeds from those who do pay will be  used to offset  the  losses of
those who don't  pay and, consequently,  those farmers making their payments
are  subsidizing those who default;  second,  if  there  is  some  form of  federal
assistance, it will likely be  targeted  to those who are  not making their
payments, and so those who do  pay will be  penalized by not  receiving direct
benefits  from any government  assistance program;  and  third, massive defaults
will put  additional pressure  on  the public  sector to  provide assistance,  and
if  such assistance is not  forthcoming and the  lender takes aggressive
foreclosure action (which also would be  unlikely if  there  are  massive
defaults  on the part of  borrowers),  the  payment could  be made  at  the last
minute during the  redemption period without  risk of  losing control or
ownership of  the property.
These two behaviors  noted earlier suggest a third concern about
changing attitudes in rural  communities.  There appear to be  changing stan-
dards of  "honesty" or  "commitment"  in  rural communities  compared  to earlier
years.  The  "your word is  your bond" attitude is  no longer standard.  Rural
people are not necessarily becoming blatantly dishonest, but  they are more
willing to accept  the grey area between "right"  and "wrong" and accept  less
than "pure" business decisions.  The reasons  for  this  change in standards of
honesty may be  twofold:  one,  that people's  standards sometimes  are adjusted
when financial survival  is  at  stake,  and two,  farmers  feel  that their
current financial problems  are  "not all their own fault"  and  that  others -
including lenders,  business  firms,  and  the  government - are partly  to  blame,-24-
so it  is justified to transfer part of  the  loss  to others  through defaulting
on commitments.  A fundamental question is  whether these perceived changes
in the  "moral fiber"  in rural communities  are  transitory or permanent, and
what  they might imply  concerning future business arrangements and  even per-
sonal and social commitments  of  those who  live in rural communities.
CONCLUSIONS
Data from many states  along with  those from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture indicate that  a significant number  of  farmers  are suffering
financial stress.  This stress is  a result  of  the many changes  in  the finan-
cial environment  for agriculture  and  is  not  simply a result  of  lower
incomes.  Other factors  that  contribute to  the  financial stress problem of
the U.S.  agricultural  sector are a higher debt  load, shorter maturities  on
debt, reduced liquidity, higher and more volatile  interest  rates,  increased
income and collateral risk, limited availability of  refinancing alter-
natives, and asset  liquidations.  Government policies  of  the past have
contributed  to today's  financial stress by  encouraging higher land values,
more debt utilization, growth in farm size,  and higher interest  rates.
Given the complex nature of  the  financial stress problem, a public
policy  approach that focuses  only  on one characteristic of  that  problem will
probably  be ineffective.  Specifically, price and  income  support programs
that  have been the major component of  agricultural  policy in  the  past may be
quite ineffective in solving the  current financial stress problem - such-25-
programs do not  focus on some  of  the major dimensions of  the  stress  problem
(i.e.,  loan maturities, liquidity, collateral risk,  etc.),  and furthermore,
quite likely will not  be  targeted to  those  individuals who have financial
stress.  Such  programs may  in fact  compound and contribute to  the  longer-run
financial problems  in agriculture.
Various policy  options that are  more targeted to  the financial  stress
problem have been identified, including interest rate  buy-downs,  debt mora-
toria,  debt restructuring, asset  restructuring, recapitalization, etc.
While  spiraling farm debt suggests  that debt  restructuring is  the answer  to
the  current financial stress, a restructuring of  agricultural assets  remains
the key to a long-term solution.  The results  of  both firm level and  the
aggregate analyses indicate that asset  restructuring  through sale-leasebacks
is  a preferred option to  interest  rate  buy-downs  or  liability restructuring
in reducing financial stress for  individual farm firms  and  the industry.
The rearranging of liabilities  is  not  a permanent solution  to  the current
financial stress, because even with more time  to  repay, many farmers  will
not be able to service their  debt with current  or expected interest  rates,
productivity, and input and commodity prices.  However, debt  restructuring
is  an important mechanism for buying  time  to implement more permanent solu-
tions.  Asset restructuring including liquidation, debt  reductions,  and
equity infusions will be  required to improve  the  chances of  long-term sur-
vivability of many farm businesses.
One of  the key objectives  of  any  public policy to alleviate  financial-26-
stress should be to protect the  resource markets from collapsing -
stabilizing resources values  is  critical to maintaining  the stability of  the
agricultural production sector and  rural communities.  If resource values
decline precipitously because of  excessive supplies  being offered  to a
market that has  no liquidity  to absorb them, many  farmers who were a "good
credit risk" will no  longer be so because of  declining collateral  values.
But using government intervention to stabilize  resource values  at  levels
that  are not  supportable in the  long run can result  in very high government
costs,  inefficient resource allocation, and higher consumer prices  for  food
products.  Such a result  is  also  clearly not desirable.
The agricultural sector has  suffered significant wealth losses  during
recent years.  An important  public policy concern is  how those losses will
be shared among the various firms  in the  private sector  (farmers,  lenders,
input supply firms,  landlords,  etc.)  and between the  public sector and  the
private sector.  A related concern is how to keep  the losses  from becoming
more severe than they need be.  A strategy of  doing nothing  today could,  if
the financial condition of  agriculture continues  to deteriorate,  very easily
result in irresistible political and economic pressures to  implement drastic
options  later such as  a general and extended debt moratorium or  significant
increases in commodity support prices.  But  inappropriate action now may
interfere with the longer-run adjustments  in resource values  and utilization
that must occur  to retain an efficient  and financially sound agricultural
sector.Table  1.  U.S.  Farm:  Debts  and  Assets  by Leverage
Debt  to  Asset Ratio  (percent)
0-10  11-40  41-70  71+  Total  (%)
Operators  (%)  58  24  11  8  100
Debt  (%)  5  32  32  31  100
Assets  (%)  47  32  14  8  100
Source:  Melichar,  January 1984  Federal Reserve  Bulletin.Table  2.  Estimated  Percentage Distributions of  Sample  Farm
Operators,  Their Assets  and Liabilities  by Relative
Debt Levels*
Debt  to  Asset Ratio  (percent)
0-10  11-40  41-70  71+
Operators  (%)  36  35  18  10
Assets  (%)  30  40  21  9
Liabilities  (%)  3  32  40  25
Source:  Farm Finance  Survey, March  1984,  Iowa Department of
Agriculture.
*Totals  may  not equal  100  due  to  rounding errors.Table  3.  Estimated Percentage Distributions  of Iowa Farm Operators,  Their
Debt and  Assets  by  Farm  Size and  Debt Level  Categories*
Debt-to-Asset Ratio  (%)
0-10  11-40  41-70  71+
Farm Size**
Number in  Sample  13  7  7  5
Very small  % Operators  41  22  22  16
% Assets  39  25  25  11
% Debt  0  25  41  34
Number  in  Sample  61  45  25  17
Small  % Operators  41  30  17  11
% Assets  41  31  18  11
% Debt  3  25  33  38
Number  in  Sample  211  199  95  58
Medium  % Operators  37  35  17  10
% Assets  34  37  18  11
% Debt  3  31  35  31
Number  in  Sample  29  55  33  6
Large  % Operators  24  45  27  5
% Assets  24  45  26  5
% Debt  4  35  47  14
Number  in  Sample  314  306  160  86
All  % Operators  36  35  18  10
% Assets  30  40  21  9
% Debt  3  32  40  25
Source:  Farm  Finance Survey, March 1984,  Iowa Department of  Agriculture.
*Totals  may not  equal  100  due  to  rounding errors.
**Size  Category  Assets
Very small  Under  $50,000
Small  $50,000-$199,999
Medium  $200,000-$999,999
Large  $1,000,000  and  overTable  4.  Target  Groups  for  Financial  Policy
Percent of  U.S.  Total
Group  Operators  Debt  Assets
Not restructurable1 15.1  27.6  8.8
Restructurable  45.8  36.5  55.1
Profitable3 39.1  35.9  36.1
Source:  1984  Farm Costs  and Returns  Survey,  USDA
Insolvent or had  a return  to  equity  less  than -20  percent.
2Return  to  equity  from -20  to  +5 percent.
3Return  to  equity  greater  than  +5  percent.